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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ALICE R. BEN ALLY and
PERLINDA BENALLY, by
her guardian ad litem, ALICE
R. BENALLY,
Plaintiffs- Appellants,

v.

Case No. 9677

L. G. ROBINSON, CLIFFORD
G. EDMUNDS and
LOUIS W. DUN'CAN,
Defendants - Respondents.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the surviving
wife and daughter to recover damages for the
wrongful death of their husband and father caused
by the defendants who are Salt Lake Ci\ty Police
Officers.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court at the pretrial of the case granted a
motion for a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, Clifford G. Edmunds and Louis W.
Duncan. As to the defendant, L. G. Robinson, the
case was tried to a jury. From the summary judglnent that was entered in favor of the defendants,
1
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Clifford G. Edmunds and Louis W. Duncan, and
from a verdict and judgment in favor of the defend~nt, L. G. Robinson, plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the summary judg~
ment in favor of the defen·dants, Clifford G. Edmunds and Louis W. Duncan, and reversal of the
judgmen\t in favor of the defendant, L. G. Robinson,
and that plaintiffs be granted a new trial as to all
of the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants are Salt Lake City Police Officers.
Thomas Dee Benally, the dece·dent, was a Navajo
Indian and was 22 year~s of age at the time of his
death. Alice R. Benally is the wife of the decedent
an·d Perlinda Benally is the minor daughter.
On November 26, 1960, the defendant, Clifford G. Edmunds, was on duty in the Salt Lake
City Jail as Chief Jailer. The defendant, Louis W.
Duncan, was on duty as the Assistant Jailer. On
the same day the defendant, L. G. Robinson, was on
duty and was running the patrol wagon which is
commonly called the "paddy wagon". Robinson has
been employed as a police officer since 1946.
On November 26, 1960, Robinson saw Benally
in downtown Salt Lake for the first time at about
6:30 P.M. (R. 107) Sometime later on the same
2
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evening Robinson again observed Benally in a drunken condition. Benally was immediately placed under
arrest. At the time of the arrest, Benally had blood
on his face and his coat was on upside down. Benally was placed in the paddy wagon and taken to
the City jail. Robinson helped Benally out of the
wagon because he felt that for a man in Benally's
condition it would be dangerous to let him try and
get out of the wagon himself. ( R. 112) Robinson
got behind the decedent and took him up the steps
to the entrance of the jail. (See Exhibit 1.) While
standing there pushing the door bell to be admitted
by the jailer, Benally lurched backward and both
Rdbinson and Benally fell com·pletely to the ground
with Benally landing on top of Robinson. Robinson
then got up and again took Benally up the stairs,
the door was opened and they entered the reception
room. From there Rdbinson and Benally were ·admitted to the ''booking area'' of the jail.
Robinson proceeded to search Benally and give
his belongings to the jailer. There was no p·articular
difficulty with this until Robinson a:ttempted to
reach in the watch pocket of Benally for the purpose
of removing its contents. Benally seemed to object
to this part of the searching procedure. As a result,
Robinson took Benally's hands in his and placed
them on the wire screen on the west side of the booking area and by using his body he puslhed Ben'ally
3
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against the wire screen and held him in that position. W'hen he again attempted to get the contents
of 'tne watch pocket, Benally dropped to the floor
on his hands and knees and attempted to get hold
of Ro binson's leg. Robinson then swung his left leg
over Benally and stood astraddle of him. He was
then able to remove the '$10.00 bill from Benally's
watch pocket. (R. 156-157) As to what occurred
from here on, the evidence is in conflict. Robinson
testified that he released Benally after removing
the $10.00 ~bill. That he watched Benally out of the
corner of his eye. As Benally got to his feet he started moving backwards very fast in a northeasterly
direction until he hit the wire mesh door tha:t was
hooked open, and this seemed to propel him to the
left ·down the stairs where ·Benally went head over
heels and landed on the cement floor on his back.
(R. 161-163)
1

An inmate and a jail trusty, James Day, testified that Robinson had a stick in his hand that was
approximately 1 foot long and 3J.t of an inch in diameter and that while he was astraddle Benally
that he had Benally's head between 'his legs and
hit him on the head two or three times with the
stick. That Benally tried to pull away from Robinson and in so doing did get free and that he backed
across the booking area into the wire door that was
open at the head of the stairs and 'this seemed to
4
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turn him to the left and he fell down the stairs.
James Day also testified that prior to the time that
Benally fell down the stairs he heard Edmunds,
the Chief Jailer, say to Robinson that he wasn't
going to accept anybody that was beat up. Day
testified that RolJinson made no answer to this
remark. ( R. 305-311)
Another inmate, Thomas L. Casteel, testified
that approximately thirty minutes prior to the time
Benally was brought in the jail, that he had been
booked on a charge of being a federal probation
violator. Casteel and Day were inside the cell block
door and Benally and Robinson were in the booking
area. (See Exhibit 6.) There is an opening in the
cell block door that is about 12" x 15". It has no
glass in it but does have some ba~s across it. Casteel
and Day were approximately twenty feet from Robinson and were looking through the window in the
cell block door. (R. 200-202) Casteel observed that
Benal'ly was very drunk and that when Robinson
first brought him into the booking area that Robinson had a club in his ·hand that was about llj2 inches
to 2 inches in diameter. That Ben·ally had difficulty
standing so Robinson laid the club on the counter
and then used both hands trying to keep Benally up.
At this point Casteel turned away from the window
in the cell block door while James Day stood there
still watching what was going on in the booking
1

1
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area. Casteel then heard Edmunds say, "Robinson,
if you don/t q1tit be.ating these guys up I am going
to quit taking them". Following this the only comment m·ade by Robinson was an angry, "God damn
son-of-a-bitch". (R. 2'30-23'2) About ten to twenty
seconds later Casteel testified that he heard scuffling and heard something hit ·a door as if it were
bouncing against a concrete wall or a brick wall
·and at that point James Day turned to Casteel and
said, "Robinson has knocked him down the steps".
(R. 233)
Robin·son and another officer who had just
entered the jail after Benally's fall, brought Benally upstairs to the booking area. They carried him
through the cell block door and back into the cell
block where they, according to Casteel, "Pitched
him forward onto the floor". (R. 237) Benally
was left on the floor in an unconscious condition.
It was not until the late afternoon of the next
day, Novem'ber 27, 1960, that Benally was taken
to the Salt Lake County Hospital. He was in the
hospital from that time until November 30, 1960,
when he died as a result of the head and brain injuries that he received fron1 the fall down the stairs.
(R. 123-134)
At the head of the stairway down which Benally fell, there is a heavy wire mesh door that is
equipped with a spring designed to keep the door
6
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closed at all times except when in actual use for
ingress or egress. Captain E. J. Steinfeldt, who was
acting Chief of Police at the time of trial, testified
tha't in 1956 or 1957 the stairway was changed
because it was ·dangerous. A number of prisoners
who were intoxicated had fallen down the stairs
and for that reason the heavy wire mesh door was
placed at the head of the stairs with the spring on
it to keep it closed at all times except when in actual
use. (R. 185-187) Steinfeldt testified that it was
common knowledge among the officers on the police
force that the changes made in the booking area
and the install'ation of the gate at the head of the
stairs was for safety reasons. (R. 19'2) He further
testified that it was the arresting officer's duty
to keep the prisoner under control at all times during the booking and until the prisoner was locke'd
in his cell. ( R. 196)
At the time Robinson entered the :booking area
with Benally the wire door at the head of the stairs
was open and was held open by a wire hook. All
Rdbinson would have ha·d to do when he entered the
booking area was turn 'his eyes to the left and he
would have observed the door open, but this he
didn't do. ( R. 183) During his career as a police
officer, Robinson had booked many a drunk person.
He knew that the booking area was a small, restricted area. ( R. 180-181) Robinson did not close
7
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the door during the booking of Benally nor did he
close it prior to the time he rele,ased Benally.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE!FUSING TO
SUBMIT THE 'CASE TO THE JURY ON THE THEORY
0'F NEGLIGENCE.
POINT II
THE C'OURT ERRED IN XDMITTING, OVER OBJECTION, THE TESTIM'ONY 'OF THE DEFENDANT,
UOUTS W. DUNCAN, THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
GIVEN AT THE CORONER''S INQ'UEST.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS
NO. 21, 22 AND 23.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE T'HEORY
0'F NEGLIGENCE.

From the very beginning plaintiffs have asserted liability against the defendants on three differen theories :
That the defendant, L. G. Robinson, willfully threw Benally down the stairs.
1.

That the defendant, L. G. Robinson, used
an unreasonable amount of force in booking Benally
and this resulted in Benally being propelled down
the stairs.
3. That the defendants were negligent in that,
2.

8
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a. Clifford G. Edmunds and Louis W.
Duncan failed to close the door at the head of the
stairs or take such other precautions as might lbe
necessary to prevent Benally from injur'ing himself.
b. L. G. Robinson should have either closed
the door at the head of the stairs before releasing
Benally in the booking area or, considering Benally's condition an·d all of the other circumstances,
he should have kept Benally under control or taken
other precautions so as to prevent him from falling
down the stairs and injuring himself.
These theories of liability have been asserted
from the inception of this case. See the complaint
(R. 1), plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories submitted by defendant, Louis W. Duncan (R. 15),
plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories su·bmitted by
defendant, Clifford G. Edmunds ( R. 17), contentions of plaintiffs served on all parties prior to the
pretrial (R. 21), plaintiffs' requested Instruction
No. 7 ( R. 35), plaintiffs' exceptions to instructions
as given by the court (R. 418-419) and the memorandum of authorities presented to the court prior
to trial.
The court by its Instructions 20, 21, 22, 23 and
24 submitted the case to the jury on the theory that
the defendant, Robinson, was liable only if Benally's fall down the stairs was caused by Robinson
deliberately throwing him down the stairs or by
9
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Robinson using excessive and unreasonable force.
Judge Faux I·efused to instruct the jury that Robinson would be liable if he was guilty of only negligen·ce that caused Benally's fall and resulting death.
('See plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 7 (R. 35)
and the court's notation thereon "not given" and
requested Instruction No. 1 ( R. 38) and the court's
notation thereon ''given in substance, element of
negligence omitted".) Judge Van Cott by granting
the motion for summary judgment of Edmunds and
Duncan in effect held that there could be no liability
on their part for their negligence in failing to close
the door at the head of the stairs or in failing to
take other precautions to prevent the decedent from
injuring himself.
The fundamental issue involved in this appeal
is whether or not a police officer is liable for injury
or death of a prisoner that is proximately caused by
the police officer's negligence or is a police officer
liable only for injury or death of a prisoner if it
results from a willful wrongful act of the officer
or from the use of unreasonable and excessiYe force.
It 'is plain tiffs' position that a police officer is liable
for negligence that results in injury or death to a
prisoner. And this is true whether the negligence
be called a "misfeasance" or a "nonfeasance".
Exhibit 6 is a diagram of the City Jail. Exhibit 1 is a photograph showing the steps and the
10
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entrance to the jail. Exhibit 3 is a photograph that
is taken just inside the front door of the jail and
shows the wire mesh wall and door that leads into
the booking area. This photograph also shows the
wire door that is at the head of the stairs in question. It should be noted that the diagram of the jail,
Exhibit 6, shows a heavy dark wall between the
l'eception room and the booking area. From looking
at that exhibit it might be thought that the wall is
a solid wall. \This is not true. The wall is a wire
mesh wall and a wire mesh door 'as is shown by
Exhibit 3. It should be noted that the distance from
the door at the head of the stairs to the wire wall
that separates the reception room from the hea·d of
the stairs is 3' 10". The distance from the west side
of the stairs to the booking window is only 3' 21j2 ".
The overall distance from the east side of the stairs
to the other side or west side of the booking area is
only 6' 8". The booking area as will 'be seen from
the diagram, Exhibit 6, is small and restricted. This
fact Rdbinson well knew and admitted knowing.
(R. 180) All of the defendants as did all of the other
officers on the force knew that the door was placed
at the head of the stairs for safety reasons because
several persons particularly those who were intoxicated had fallen down the stairs. Captain E. J.
Steinfeldt, the officer in charge of the jail, testi1
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fied that the door was installed in 1956 or 19'57. In
addition, he testified as follows at p. 185:
"Q. It was during that year then that
you say that you put this heavy wire door at
the head of the stairs, the stairs that Benally went down?
"A. Correct.
"Q. And you put it up there for what
reason?
"A. A safety measure.
"Q. And why did you feel that it should
be there for safety purposes?
"A. Well ordinarily an individual just
not knowing the stairway was there would fall
down it.''
Captain Steinfeldt testified that prior to the
installation of this door, a number of people, particularly those who were intoxicated, had fallen
down the stairs and that this was the reason for
the change. (R. 187) Steinfeldt further testified
on p. 1H2,
"Q. Now Chief one more question here.
When you made all of these changes in the
booking area and put this gate in at the head
of the stairs, was this pretty much co1nmon
knowledge among the officers on the force at
that time?
''A. Yes.
''Q. And in particular to those who
would have been using the jail?
''A. Yes.
12
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"Q. And was it pretty much common
knowledge among your officers as to why
you were doing it?
"A.

Yes.

"Q. And that common knowledge was
that it was for safety purposes?
A. Correct.''
At the time of the accident the d'efendant,
Edmunds, was the senior officer and was in charge
of the jail. ( R. 192)
An arresting officer is responsible for his prisoner during the booking and until the prisoner is
placed in his cell. ( R. 190) If the arresting officer
needs help with the prisoner, he should request assistance from the jailer. (R. 190) Robinson had no
difficulty handling Benally and he at no time requested Edmunds or Duncan to assist him. (R. 159160) Robinson knew Benally was drunk. At p. 17 0
the following question was asked and answer was
given.
"Q. (By Mr. Crellin) You testified
that by a classification of drunk, slightly
drunk or very drunk that you would classify
Mr. Benally as having been very drunk is that
correct?
''A. Correct.''
At p. 122 the following questions were asked
and answers given.

''Q.

Now when you got out of the wagon
13
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at the police station, what did you do then,
Mr. Robinson?
"A. Helped him from the wagon over
to the steps and up the steps.
"Q. Now you say you helped him out
of the wagon?
''A. I did.
"Q. And what was the reason for helping him out?
"A. Well there is quite a step from the
wagon down to the ground and a man in his
condition would be dangerous to let him make
the step by himself.
"Q. And how far would this step be, I
mean in feet from the getting out of the wagon
down to the ground?
A. I'd say possibly two feet."
Robinson knew that Benally had lurched against
him when they were about to enter the jail and had
caused both of them to fall to the ground. In again
classifying his condition Robinson said he was to
a staggering and mumbling point but still mobile.
(R. 171) Robinson knew he had difficulty with
Benally after he got in the booking area in searching him. When Benally was arrested his jacket was
on upside down and he had 'blood on his face. (R.
109)
All of the defendants knew or should have
known that the door at the head of the stairs was
open. They all knew that it was placed there for
14
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safety reasons, that the booking area was small
and restricted and that there was a great likelihood
that if a person in an intoxicated condition was in
the booking area th'at that person, if the door was
open, would fall down the stairs.
Certainly Duncan and Edmunds knew or s·hould
have known that with the door that had ~been placed
there for safety purposes, open, a d~a.ngerous condition existed and in particular a dangerous situation existed for a prisoner who was intoxicated.
Assuming that Robinson had no duty at all with
respect to the closing of the door inasmuch as Edmunds and Duncan, being the jailers, were in charge
of the jail, prior to the time that Robinson released
Benally, still it must \be kept in mind that Ro binson
knew the door was there, knew why it was there,
knew the condition of Benally and if he was not
required prior to releasing Benally, to affirmatively
shut the door, certainly he should be required before
he released Benally to either shut the door or if he
did not do th'at he should keep Benally under such
control that Benally in his then condition could not
fall down the stairs and injure himself.
1

As seen from the foregoing there is ample evidence fron1 which a jury could find that Duncan
and Edmunds were negligent for leaving the door
at the head of the stairs open and th~at Robinson
was negligent when he released Benally in the book15
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irig area without first closing the door or taking
other pi~ec[tutions to prevent Benally from falling
down the stairs. The question is whether under the
law of this state a police officer is liable for injury
or death of a prisoner that results from the police
officer's negligence as distinguished from his willful or intentional wrongful acts or his excessive
use of force.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Lowry
v. C~arbon County, et al, 64 U. 555, 232 P. 908
( 1924), has held that a public official in the perform~ance of his duty is liable for injury or death of
another caused by the negligent acts of the public
official. In th'at case the county commissioners were
personally engaged in building a road through
Helper. They carelessly set a charge of dynamite
to blast some rock. This rock hit the decedent and
resulted in his death. The court in the Lowry case
cites the Massachusetts case of Moynihan v. Todd,
188 M~ass. 301, 74 N.E. 367, and by dicta seems
to adopt the rule that public officials are liable for
a misfeasance but are not li~able for a nonfeasance.
Again it should be observed that this is only dicta.
The narrow holding of the Lowry case is that a
pu'blic official is liable for his negligent acts.
In the first place there can be no merit to the
distinction between a nonfeasance and ·a misfeasance. If there is a duty to act and a failure that
16
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results in injury or death, the resulting damage is
the sa1ne whether the harm resulted from a negligent act or a failure to act in the face of a duty to
act. We respectfully urge this court to ignore the
dicta in the Lowry case and to adopt a rule predicating lia'bility on the theory of negligence whether
the negligence be a so called "misfeasance" or a
"nonfeasance". Many states have adopted such a
rule and have made no distinction in determining
the liability of a police officer for injury or death
of a prisoner.
Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E. 2d 150,
involved a case where the plaintiff's son suffered
from a nervous breakdown making him oblivious to
danger. The sheriff ·arrested the boy and put him
'in jail. The p'arents notified the sheriff of the boy's
condition and requested the sheriff to keep him in
in a place of safety. The sheriff permitted the boy
to roam in an upstairs hallway of the jail where
there was an open space into which he fell to his
death. The sheriff in this case failed to take measures
to keep the boy in a safe place. The court held the
sheriff was liable for such failure.

The case of Justice v. Rose, 102 Ohio App. 482,
144 N.E. 2d 303, adopts the majority rule that a
sheriff or other officer must exercise reasonable
and ordinary care to insure the preservation of life
and the health of a prisoner. The court observes
17
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that the statute imposingJ a duty on the sheriff_ to
keep priisoners safely is_ merely declaratory of the
common law which imposes that duty on the sheriff
and requires him to exercise reasonable care and
diligence to protect a prisoner from :a danger that
is known to him or which might be reasonably anti~
cipated by him. The court says liability of the sheriff
is predicated on negligence.
Smith v. Miller, 241 Ia. 625, 40 N.W. 2d 597,
14 A.L.R. 2d 345 ( 1950), involved an action to
recover damages for wrongful death of a prisoner
that died in the county jail. He was the only prisoner. No guards were kept in the jail. He was visited
by officers only at times necesS'ary to feed him. He
had no means of communication with the people
outside except by shouting. No one in the immediate vicinity of the jail had a key or means of
evacuating prisoners in ·an emergency. The decedent
died from suffocation when the jail filled with smoke
from a burning mattress, which was presumably
ignited ·by a cigarette. The lower court entered a
judgment for the defendant and the Supreme Court
reversed. The court in reversing quoted from Odell
v. Goodsell, 149 Neb. 261, 30 N.W. 2d 906,. where
the prisoner suffocated in th·e jail by a burning mattress ·and the Supreme Court of Nebraska held it
was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for
the sheriff. The N elbraska court said,
18
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•·\\re think it was error for the trial court

to refuse to submit to a jury the failure of the
sheriff to provide a guard for the jail in its
described condition and the proper inferences
to be drawn from such failure. We also think
it was error for the court to refuse to submit
to a jury the question of the adequacy of ventilation under the circumstances and the failure to make outside communication available
and the proper inferences to be drawn from
the circumstances.
'·'We think that the question of whether
the sheriff under the circumstances failed to
respond to his duty to the plaintiff's decedent
in light of the potential d'anger of which he
knew or in the ordinary exercise of his facilities for observation and understanding
should have known, was a question for determination by a jury.''
Clark v. Kelly, 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S.E. 365,
46 A.L.R. 799, involved an ·action against the sheriff
for damages for injury when ·a jail flooded. In holding that the sheriff was liable for failure to take
precautions to prevent the flooding of the jail the
court said,
"We will not undertake to review all the
decisions cited by counsel for the proposition
many times affirmed, that a public officer is
liable to anyone injured by the nonperformance or negligent perform,ance of ·his ministerial duties, and this without regard to his
motives and without reference to any question
of corruption; and whether he has discharged
these imposed duties is generally a question
of fact for the jury."
19
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The annotation in 14 A.L.R. 2d 345 entitled
"Civil Liability of Sheriff or Other Officer Charged
with Keeping Jail or a Prison for Death or Injury
of Prisoner", states the rule as follows,
"The majority of courts hold that the
sheriff or other officer, owes a duty to the
prisoner to keep him safely and to protect
him from unnecessary harm and· it has also
been held that the officer must exercise
reasonable and ordin·ary care for the life and
health of the prisoner."
In support of this rule our own case of Richardson
v. Capwell, 63 U. 616, 176 P. 205, is cited. The Utah
case involved an action against the town marshal
and the justice of the peace. Insofar as it affected
the town marshal, the plaintiff claimed damages on
the ground that during the time that he was in
prison he was given insufficiei1t nourishment, was
exposed to the ·cold and was put in an unsanitary
and filthy jail. The trial court failed to give any
instructions to the effect that the plai11tiff could
recover damages resulting from the failure to nlaintain the jail in proper condition. The Utah Supreme
Court reversed as to this phase of the case and in
so doing said,

* * * ''It does appear that the defendant,

Jenkins, a~ ~own marsh·al was the keeper of
the town Jail and was supposed to furnish
food for the prisoners as well as to keep the
b~ilding ~arm. and sanitary. If plaintiff desires, he Is entitled to have the question as to
20
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damages, if any, he m·ay have sustained- in
these particulars, submitted to the jury; * * *"
The annotation in 60 A.L.R. 2d 873 entitled
"Personal Liability of Policeman, Sheriff or Other
Peace Officer or Bond for Negligently Causing Personal Injury or Death" cites the general rule to the
effect that a peace officer, as a general rule, is personally liable for negligent or wrongful acts causing personal injury or death. The annotation then
defines negligence as follows:
"Negligent conduct may be either (a)
an act which the actor as a reasonable man
should realize as involving an unreasonable
risk or causing an invasion of an interest of
another, or (b) a failure to do an act which
is necessary for the protection or assistance
of another and which the actor is under a
duty to do."
In 80 C.J.S., Sec. 117, p. 3'26, the rule is stated,
"A sheriff owes a duty to ·a prisoner in
his custody to keep him in health and free
from harm. He must exercise ordinary and
reasonable care under the circumstances to
preserve the life, health and safety of a prisoner in his care and custody, * * *"
In 72 C.J.S., Sec. 13, p. 866, the rule is stated,
"A jail official has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent injuries to a prisoner by
his fellow prisoners."
Hunt Y. Rowton, 143 Okla. 181, 288 P. 342,
involved a suit against a sheriff for negligence in
21
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the sheriff failing to isolate a prisoner that was
suffering from sm'all pox from the rest of the
prisoners. The deceased contacted the disease and
died. The court held the sheriff was liable and affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the
ground that the sheriff was negligent in failing to
isolate the prisoner who was infected with a contagious dise~ase.
We ~submit that no distinction should be made
between a misfeasance and a nonfeasance, and that
the Utah Court should ignore the dicta in the Lowry
case and predicate li'ability of a police officer on
the theory of negligence whether the negligence be
for action or nonaction. In the event such a distinction is made it is our position that as to the defendant, Ro'binson, his negligence is definitely a
misfeasance. He has control of the decedent and
he affirmatively rele'ases the decedent in a place of
danger knowing that the decedent is likely to injure himself by reason of his intoxicated condition
and by reason of the fact that the door at the ·head
of the stairs is open. Even under the rule announced
by the Lowry case, Robinson's negligent act of releasing the decedent in a place of danger would be
sufficient on which to predicate liability.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in Bukaty v.
Berglund, 179 Ka. 259, 294 P. 2d 2'28 ( 1956), reversed the lower court's dismissal of an action
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against a sheriff that was grounded on the theory
that to recover from a police officer there had to be
a showing of willfulness or malice or bad faith. 'The
Supreme Court after reviewing a number o'f cases
rejected that rule and held that a sheriff or other
person h'aving another in custody is lialble for injuries or death caused by his negligen,ce.
The defendants in this case will undoubtedly
cite Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 U. 520, 57 P. 2d 1128, for
the proposition that a police officer is not liable
unless a showing of malice or bad faith on the part
of an officer is shown. The Roe case is definitely
not authority for this proposition lbut merely holds
that an officer who commits a trespass in the enforcement of an invalid ordinance is civilly liable
for that trespass. The statements in the case that
indicate that "willful negligence, malice, or corruption constituting misfeasance" are necessary before
an officer is liable, are dicta and we again urge this
court to ignore the dicta of the Roe case and Lowry
case and ~announce a rule that is in accord with the
later 'decisions of other states that have dealt with
the problem; namely, that a peace officer is liable
for injury or death that result from his negligence
and that is true whether the negligence be a misfeasance or a nonfeasance.

Thomas v. Williams, 124 S.E. 2d 409, (Ga.
1962), was an action to recover dam,ages for a
1

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

wrongful de~ath. In that case the chief of police
arrested the decedent for drunk driving and disorderly conduct and put him in a cell in a partially
unconscious and helpless condition. The decedent had
matches and a lighted cigarette in his possession.
Defen d·ant thereafter left the j~ail without leaving
anyone in attendance and defendant failed to take
the m~atches and lighted cigarette from decedent.
While defendant was gone a m~attress caught fire
in the cell and the decedent suffocated. The officer
returned while the mattress was burning and instead of immediately getting the decedent out of
the cell, he got a hose and turned the water on the
mattress which the plaintiff claims increased the
smoke and the danger to the prisoner.
1

The trial court dismissed the complaint and
on appeal the appellate court reversed and in so doing announced the general rule that an officer h·aving custody of a prisoner, has a duty to exercise
ordinary care to keep his prisoner safe and free
from harm. The court then discusses the affect of
the prisoner being drunk and i11 so doing says,
"The law is that a person is charged with
knowledge that a man staggering drunk is
incapable of exercising ordinary care for his
own safety, and he is bou11d to deal with him
with th~at fact in mind. Bennett Drug Stores
v. Moseley, 6·7 Ga. App. 347, 20 S.E. 2d 208.
The present petition alleges that the officer
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had knowledge of the prisoner's helpless condition. If this be true, the officer in perform~
ing his duty to exercise ordinary diligence to
keep the prisoner safe and free from harm,
was bound to deal with him with his condition
in min·d.''
"In the performance of his· duty to exercise ordinary diligence to keep h~s prisoner
safe and free from harm, ~an officer having
custody of a prisoner, when he has knowledge
of facts from which it might be concluded that
the prisoner may harm himself or others unless preclusive measures are taken, must use
reasonable care to prevent such harm. In some
circumstances reasonable care may require
the officer to act affirmatively to fulfill this
duty."
The court then goes on to s~ay,
HThe present petition presents these
questions which must be decided by the jury:
"Was the officer negligent in leaving the
prisoner incarcerated in a close cell anld unattended, with a lighted cigarette and matc·hes
on his person, when he knew the prisoner
was partially unconscious and helpless?
Q'Should the officer, under the circumstances, in the exercise of his duty to keep the
prisoner safe and free from harm, h~ave immediately rescued the prisoner upon becoming aware of the fire in the cell?
"Was the officer negligent in pumping
water on the burning mattress in the prisoner's cell, in that he should, in the exercise of
ordinary care, have anticipated th~at this
would increase the danger of the prisoner?"
25
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Muniz v. United States, Docket No. 26841, 2nd
Cir. N.Y. decided February 27, 1962. (The case is
not reported at this time.) This case involved a suit
by a Federal prisoner who was allegedly beaten into
insensibility and partiallJlinidness 'by fellow inmates.
The court held that a cause of action was stated
alleging negligence in supervision of the prisoners
that resulted in injury to the plaintiff.
The court in this case held 'that the exception
barring claims "arising out of assault" did not apply
in this case. The exception applies only to assault
by government agents, not to assaults by third persons which the government negligently fails to prevent. (Emphasis ours)
App1ying the rules of the foregoing cases to
the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that all
of the defendants were negligent. All of the defendants knew the door at the head of the stairs was
placed there for safety purposes, that prisoners and
particularly intoxicated ones had fallen 'down the
stairs prior to the installation of the wire door, that
the door was equipped with a spring to keep it shut
unless it was affirmatively opened and hooked to
the wall, that Benally was in a "very drunk" condition, that he was uncooperative during the booking procedure, that the 'booking area was small, restricted and 'a dangerous place wh,en the door was
open. Rdbinson knew that the decedent ~had blood
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on his face and his coat was upside down at the
time of the arrest, that he was very drunk and that
he was incapable of getting out of the patrol wagon
alone without danger to himself, that he lurched
outside the jail causing 'both himself and Robinson
to fall to the ground, that he was very uncooperative
during the search procedure. Under these circumstances it is difficult to see what other conclusion
could be drawn than Edmunds and Duncan should
have anticipated that a person in Benally's condition could very well injure him~self by falling down
the stairs unless they closed the door at the head
of the stairs or unless they took other precautions
to prevent Benally from injuring himself. As far
as Robinson is concerned knowing the condition of
the booking area, the condition of IBenally and knowing the reason for putting the door at the head of
the stairs, it is inconceivable that Robinson would
release Benally in the booking area, a place of
danger, without either first closing the door at the
head of the stairs or taking other precautions to
see that Benally did not injure himself by falling
down the stairs.
This court is again urged to disregard completely the dicta statement of the Lowry and Roe
cases and to clearly declare the rule of this state
to be that an officer is liable for a failure to exercise ordinary care when that results in injury or
27
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death to a prisoner and that this is so whether the
failure to exercise ordinary care is a misfeasance
or a nonfeasance. A life or a lim'b is as effectively
gone w·hether caused by negligent action or negligent inaction. In reason the distinction between a
so called misfeasance and a so called nonfeasance
cannot be sustained.
POINT II
THE C·OURT ERRED IN ADMITTING, OVER OBJE·CTION, THE TESTIMONY O·F THE DEFEN'DANT,
LO'UI S W. DUNCAN, THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
GIVEN AT THE CORONER'S INQUEST.
1

On Decem·ber 6, 1960, there was ·a coroner's
jnquest held in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the death
of Thomas Dee Benally. Louis W. Duncan, among
other witnesses, was called and testified.
The day before the inquest plaintiffs' present
counsel was called 'by a representative of the Navajo
Tribe and was requested to attend the inquest and
report to the Tribe the results. ( R. 3'71) Without
time to prepare and without knowing anything about
the detai·ls of the case, the writer did appear at the
inquest representing the Navajo Tribe and 11ot the
plaintiffs. The writer did question several of the
witnesses incltlding· the defenda11t, Louis \V. Duncan.
A few days prior to the trial of this case the
defendant, Duncan, was injured and at the time of
the trial was confined in ·a hospital and was unable
to attend and testify.
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At the inquest Thomas L. Casteel and James
Day testified that prior to the time that Benally
fell down the stairs they heard Edmunds say,
"Ro·bby if you don't quit beating up these
guys I am going to quit taking them".
At the inquest Officer Duncan when asked about
this statement of Edmunds said, that he did not
hear such a statement and about all he dfd hear
was Edmunds say something albout he could not or
would not take an injured prisoner and that this
statement was made after Benally had fallen down
the stairs.
After the coroner's inquest the special investigator employed by the City Commission, Mr. Arthur A. Allen, Jr., ·and a Mr. Gregory, a polygraph
operator from Chicago, interviewed several of the
officers involved including Officer Duncan. Mr.
Gregory's report filed with the City Commission
in referring to the interview with Officer Duncan
states,
"He said he is not positive, ~but is quite
sure he recalls Edmunds saying lo Robinson,
if you don't stop beating these guys up I am
not going to take them, and that this was said
while Benally was still on the floor."
This statement was inconsistenl with the testimony that Duncan had given at the coroner's inquest. It was plaintiffs' position at the trial of this
case that Duncan's testimony given at the coroner's
29
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inquest was not admissible and particularly is that
true because pllaintiffs would not be entitled to
cross-examine Duncan relative to the later inconsistent statement that he made to the polygraph operator.
It is plaintiffs' position that although plaintiffs'
attorney, Glenn C. Hanni, was present at the inquest and did in fact question Mr. Duncan, that he
was not representing plaintiffs, th~at plaintiffs were
not parties to the inquest and further that the inquest is not a judicial proceeding but is an inquisitorial proceeding for the sole purpose of determining whether or not any violation of the criminal
laws has occurred an·d therefore since plaintiffs
were not parties at the inquest ·and since the issues
at the inquest are substantially different than the
issues at the trial of this case, the testimony of
Duncan should not have been admitted.
In 31 C.J.S., Sec. 385, p. 1191, the rule is stated,
"Evidence given at a coroner's inquest
is inadmissible except that such evidence has
been held competent in some proceedings of a
special nature, such as hearings before an industrial accident commission."
In Pittsburgh Rail?,.oad Company v. McGrath,
3 N.E. 439 (Ill. 1885) the court ·held that the testimony of a witness to a railroad accident, resulting
in the death of a person injure;d, taken before a
coroner's inquest upon the body of the deceased,
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which witness had since died is inadmissible in an
action by the representative by the deceased person
against the railway comp'any for the injury resulting in such death.
Bragdon v. Northwestern R~ailroad Company,
141 S.C. 238, 139 S.E. 459, involved an action to
recover dan1ages for a wrongful death. The appellate court in sustaining the exclusion of testimony
received 'at a coroner's inquest said,

"At the trial the defendant attempted to
offer in evidence the testimony of Albert Wilson, the driver of the automobile, given at the
coroner's inquisition over the dead body of
Jemina Walker. The trial judge held this testimony incompetent and in this holding he was
absolutely correc't. If Wilson had been offered
as a witness by the plaintiff, he could have
been cross-examined 'as to this testimony before the coroner, and had 'he contradicted the
statements there made by him, the defendant
could have then offered his former testimony.
We know of no rule, however, which would
have permitted the defendant to introduce this
statemen't as original testimony on its part."
Ches,apeake (\; Ohio R,ailroad Company v. McDon.ald, 239 Ky. 258, 39 S.W. 2d 253 (1931). This
was an action to recover damages for a wrongful
death. The court in this case held that the testimony
of a witness given at a coroner's inquest was not
admissible and the Supreme Cour't on appeal affirmed. In so doing the court said,
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"It is insisted that the court erred in
refusing to allow the engineer's testimony,
given before the coroner to be read before
the jury. In Kelly v. Connell, 3 Dana 532, evidence given before arbitrators was held admissible ·(where the witness is dead) in a
subsequent suit between the same parties. So
in 0' Brien v. Com, 6 Bush 563, the evidence
of a witness on the examining trial was held
competent on the fin'al trial of the case where
the witness was dead. In North River Insurance Company v. Walker, 161 Ky. 368, 170
S.W. 983, the testimony of a dead witness,
upon the examining trial of the assured, was
held competent in his suit against the insurance company. But none of these cases involved the competency of the testimony of a
witness on a coroner's inquest. A coroner is
not 'a judicial officer. The proceeding is inquisitorial. The examination and cross-examination of witnesses are m·atters of grace
and not of right. The plaintiff was not a party
to that proceeding. In Jones on Evidence, Sec.
339, the rule is thus stated: Nor is the testimony of a witness given ·at a coroner's inquest
admissible under this exception in a subsequent action, as the inquest is not ·a judicial
proceeding belween the same parties."
Edgerly v. Appleyard, 110 Me. 337, 86 A. 244
( 1913). The court in affirming the exclusion of the
testimony of a witness given at a coroner's inquest
said,
"The single question argued and presented in this case is whether the testimony of a
witness given at a coroner's inquest upon the
death of the plaintiffs intestate was admis32
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sible in this action, when offered by the plaintiff, the witness having deceased after the inquest and before the trial. The trial court held
it was inadmissible ·and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
''~These proceedings are designed priInarily to aid in the detection of crime. The
inquest is ordinarily held immediately after
the event has happened, and often times before the perpetrator is known or ever suspected. IThey are initiated by a public officer,
there is no party defendant, and the county
attorney, as the public prosecutor, usually
elicits the evidence."
The court cleary committed prejudicial error
in admitting, over objection, the testimony of Duncan given at the coroner's inquest. That is particularly true in view of the later sta'tement made by
Duncan to the polygraph operator that was inconsistent with his testimony at the coroner's inquest
and concerning which plaintiffs were completely
deprived of their right of cross-examination.
It may be argued that because plaintiffs' attorney was present at the inquest and did question
Duncan th·at the testimony of Duncan should be admissible. This argument ignores several things; ( 1)
plaintiffs' attorney was representing the ·Tribe only
at the inquest; ( 2) plaintiffs were not p·arties to
the inquest; ( 3) the inquest was not a judicial proceeding but is merely an inquisition ; ( 4) the right
of one other than the County Attorney to examine
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witnesses is a matter of grace and not of right and
this necessarily inhibits an attorney from crossexamining a witness to the extent he might if involved in a proceeding where his client was a party,
where his client's substantial rights were involved
an·d where he was examining as of right ~and not
by grace ; ( 5) the issues were not the same; ( 6)
plaintiffs' attorney attended the inquest after being requested to do so only the day before and without a reason to prepare or adequate time to prep'are
or become acquainted with the facts. To hold that
this afforded plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine would be tantamount to holding that
a person charged with crime was afforded counsel
and a fair trial if his attorney was appointed only
the day before the trial commenced and without time
to prep~are.
Plaintiffs were seriously prejudiced by permitting the use of Duncan's inquest testimony and
for this reason the judgment as to Robinson should
be reversed.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS
NO. 21, 22 AND 23.

Instruction No. 22 reads as follows,
"You are instructed that if you find, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the
plaintiffs' deceased husband and father fell
down the stairs in the City Jail as a conse34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

quence of his own voluntary acts an.d his intoxicated condition and that said fall proximately cau·sed the injury or injuries which
resulted in his death, you may not determine
that said death was due to any bre'ach uf duty
by defendant, Robinson."
In dealing with a claim of the defendant that
because the deceased was voluntarily drunk there
should be no liability for his de'ath the court in
Thomas v. Williams, 124 S.E. 2d 409, (Ga. 1962)
said,
"The prisoner may have been drunk voluntarily, but he 'vas not in the cell voluntarily.
The prisoner was not in the class of a trespasser at the place where he was injured.
''T'he law is that a person is charged with
knowledge that a' man staggering drunk is
incapable of exercising ordinary care for his
own safety, 'and he is bot1nd to deal with him
with that fact in mind. Bennett Drug Stores v.
Moseley, 67 Ga. App. 347, 20 S.E. 2d. 208.
The present petition alleges that the officer
had knowledge of the prisoner's helpless condition. If 'this be true, the officer in performing his duty to exercise ordinary diligence to
keep the prisoner safe and free from harm,
was bound to deal with him with his condition in mind."
Since an officer's duty is to exercise reasonable care to keep his prisoner safe and free from
harm, the above instruction is clearly erroneous because the fact that Benally was "very drunk" and
unable to take care of himself, was a circumstance
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of which the defendants were well aware, and was
a circumstance that the jury was entitled to consider in determining whether or not Robinson exercised that degree of care that an ordinary person
would have exercised under the same or similar
circumstances.
The court also instructed the jury in Instruction No. 23 as follows,
"You are instructed that the defendant
was under no duty to maintain the jail in a
safe condition. Therefore, if you find from a
preponderance of the evidence that the fatal
injuries suffered by Thomas Dee Benally resulted from a fall down the stairs in the City
Jail on the evening of November 26, 1960,
and that said fall was proximately caused
by reason of the fact that the door at the head
of the jail had been left open by those in
charge of the jail, you may not determine that
said death was due to any breach of duty by
defendant Robinson."
In the first place this instruction amounts to
a comment on the evidence. It in effect tells the
jury that the fact that the jail door 'vas open is something that the jury may not take into account at all
in determining whether Robinson breached any duty.
Inasmuch as Robinson knew that Ben'ally was intoxicated and unable to care for himself and knew
that the booking area was a place of danger and
knew that the door at the head of the s'tairs had
been put there for safety reasons and that other
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prisoners in an intoxicated condition prior to that
time had fallen down the same stairs, the fact that
the door was left open was ~a circumstance that the
jury was entitled to consider in determining w'hether
or not Robinson failed to exercise ordinary care to
prevent Benally from injuring himself. The instruction also would lead the jury to believe 'that if the
fact that the door was open had anything at all to
do with Ben'ally's death, that the jury should then
find that Robinson had done no wrong.
In effect this instruction is similar to the one
involved in Hooper v. Genenal Motors Corp., 123 U .
.515, 2·60 P. 2d 549, where the jury was instructed
that the fact that the rim and spider were found
in a separated condition after the accident is no
evidence of the fact that they were defective at the
time of manufacture nor of the fact that the separating cause·d the truck to overturn. The Supreme
Court reversed holding that the fact the spider and
rim were sep·arated was some evidence bearing on
defect and on causation. So in the case at bar the
instruction as given in effect removes completely
from the jury's consideration the fact that the door
was open as having any bearing on Ro'binson's negligence. This, we think, was error.
The vice of the instruction lies in this. While
it may not have been Robinson's duty ordin'arily to
see that the door was closed since that was the
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responsibility of the people in charge of the jail,
it definitely does not follow that Robinson, if he
elected to release his prisoner, would not then have
a duty as to the door. As long as Robinson had control of his prisoner it may be supposed that he did
not have 'any duty as to the door, but once he is
about 'to release him, ordinary care requires, knowing Benally's condition, that Robinson either shut
the door before releasing Benally or that he take
other measures to prevent him from injuring himself in this place of danger.
If the law of this state is what we believe it
to be, that a police officer is liable for injury or
death of a prisoner caused by his negligence, then
clearly this instruction is wrong because the fact
that the door was open is definitely a circumstance,
along with all of the other circumstances, that the
jury is entitled to take into account in determining
whether or not Robinson, considering the knowledge
he had of the condition of the j'ail and Benally's
condition, exercise·d reasonable care for the safety
of his prisoner.
The mere fact that Edn1unds and Duncan also
had a duty to keep the door shut, would not relieve
Robinson of his duty to exercise reasonable care for
the safety of the prisoner.
As the Supreme Court of N evad·a said in Alec
Novak & Sons v. Hoppin, 359 P. 2d 390 (Nev. 1962),
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"Before negligence can be actionable,
that is to say before it can be charged against
a party to a lawsuit, such negligence must be
a proximate cause of the damage complained
of. This does not mean that the law seeks and
recognizes only one proximate cause of an
injury, consisting of only one factor, one act,
one element or circumstance, or the conduct
of any one person. 'To the contrary, the acts
and omissions of two or more persons may
work concurrently as the efficient cause of
an injury, and in such a case, each of the participating acts or omissions is regarded in
law as a proximate cause.''
So in this case it is plaintiffs' position th~t the
negligence of all three defendants concurred and
resulted in the death of Benally, and that plaintiffs
are entitled to have their case submitted to a jury
with instructions that correctly state the law.
It should be noted that the trial court used the
words "wrongful performance of duty" in its instructions. Instruction No. 21 (R. 76), consistent
with what we respectfully urge was the trial court's
erroneous view of the law, in substance defines
wrongful performance of duty as an intentional
use of unnecessary force or the use of force in excess of that which an ordinary prudent person would
have used. This instruction is clearly erroneous because it eliminates from the jury's consideration,
the predicating of liability on the ground of negligence.
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CONCLUSION

This court is urged to clearly ·announce the
rule that a police officer is liable for the injury or
de·ath of a prisoner caused by negligence, whether
that negligence be a misfeasance or ·a nonfeasance.
Prejudicial error was committed in admitting the
inquest testimony of Duncan ·and in giving the instructions discussed in Point III.
The judgment in favor of the defendants, Edmunds and Duncan, should be reversed and the case
sent back for trial. The judgment in favor of the
defendant, Robinson, should ·be reversed and a new
trial ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
GLENN C. HANNI
1229 First Security Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
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